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Abstract:  
This article examines the development and impact of German citizenship policy over the past 
decade. As its point of departure, it takes the 2000 Citizenship Law, which sought to 
undertake a full-scale reform and liberalisation of access to German membership. The article 
discusses this law’s content and subsequent amendments, focusing particularly on its 
quantitative impact, and asking why the number of naturalisations has been lower than 
originally expected. The article outlines current challenges to the law’s structure and 
operation and identifies potential trajectories for its future development. 
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Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, the study of citizenship in the developed world has been enriched 
by a major new sub-field: the analysis and explanation of patterns of and policies towards the 
acquisition of membership, both at birth and via naturalisation. The corpus of scholarship in 
this area is now substantial and nuanced, and in the context of European nation-states 
encompasses a wide range of aspects, including comparative empirical analyses (e.g. 
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Brubaker 1989, Hansen and Weil 2001, Bauböck et al. 2006), taxonomies of naturalisation 
regimes (e.g. Howard 2009) and detailed national case studies (e.g. Hansen 2000, Weil 2008, 
Green 2004). 
 
Yet despite the wealth of scholarship on this area, the question of how access to nationality is 
structured politically, legally and philosophically remains as germane now as it has been at 
any time over the past two decades. This has two key reasons. First, and notwithstanding a 
‘postnational’ turn in the 1990s (Soysal 1994, Sassen 1996, Jacobsen 1996) which held that 
globalisation and the widespread availability of social citizenship rights independently of 
membership rendered national citizenships irrelevant, nationality (still) matters. As Howard 
(2009, pp. 6-8) shows, certain rights of real significance, such as unconstrained residence and 
access to public sector employment, remain the exclusive preserve of full membership. 
Second, in the European context, national citizenship remains the sole route to the acquisition 
of citizenship of the European Union (EU). When combined with the growing chasm in rights 
between those who are EU citizens and so-called ‘Third Country Nationals’ (TCNs), the 
conditions under which the citizenship of an EU member-state can be gained are of direct 
relevance to the estimated 20 million TCNs resident in the EU in 2009. In consequence, the 
content, application and impact of individual national citizenship policies remain very much a 
live issue. 
 
Over the course of these past twenty years, two distinct phases are conventionally identified 
in the evolution of citizenship policies in Europe (Joppke 2010, Chapter 2). First, during the 
1990s, there was a broad liberalisation of access, as countries responded to the reality of 
permanent migrant communities in their territories. This took a number of forms, including 
the introduction of the territorial principle of ascription (jus soli) alongside the principle of 
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descent (jus sanguinis) and the more widespread tolerance of dual and multiple citizenships 
(Vink and de Groot 2010). In fact, this led to an (uncoordinated) convergence of nationality 
policies in Europe (Hansen and Weil 2001, Bauböck et al. 2006). Since 2001, the emphasis 
has shifted clearly away from opening up access, albeit gradually and not uniformly 
throughout Europe, towards a ‘thickening’ of citizenship, with many countries successively 
introducing assimilatory elements such as language and citizenship tests, integration courses 
and citizenship ceremonies (Goodman 2010). Notably though, this changed emphasis has not 
necessarily come at the expense of numbers naturalised: as Howard (2009, p. 217) shows, 
between 1985-90 and 2000-05, naturalisation rates, which express the annual proportion of a 
country’s non-national population acquiring citizenship, rose in eleven of fifteen EU member-
states.  
 
Against this background, the aim of this article is to discuss the development of one national 
citizenship in particular, namely that of Germany. While broad cross-national comparisons 
help us to understand overall trends, it requires a detailed case study such as this to tease out 
the nuances and fine details of individual citizenship policies. And Germany constitutes a 
particularly interesting case study, for three main reasons. First and foremost, citizenship in 
Germany has conventionally been considered as the paradigmatic example of an 
‘ethnocultural’ definition of citizenship (Brubaker 1992), with an associated high degree of 
exclusivity in terms of access for non-nationals. In practice, this meant that Germany relied 
exclusively on the principle of descent (jus sanguinis) for ascription at birth, with the 
territorial principle (jus soli) completely absent; as Kay Hailbronner, in one of the early 
discussions of German citizenship policy in English, asserted, ‘the German conception of 
citizenship and nationhood is better expressed in the principle of jus sanguinis’ (Hailbronner 
1989, p. 77). In parallel, naturalisation was to be an exceptional act, which therefore justified 
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high assimilatory requirements on the part of applicants, including long periods of residence, 
the payment of high fees and the rejection of dual and multiple citizenships (Green 2004, pp. 
39-41). In consequence, the numbers of non-nationals actually becoming Germans remained 
negligibly low, and failed to rise above 20,000 throughout the 1970s and 1980s, resulting in 
annual naturalisation rates of below 0.5 per cent throughout this time.  
 
Second, the last full reform of German citizenship, which took place in 1999 and came into 
force on 1 January 2000, was of major symbolic and political significance. Its predecessor, 
the 1913 Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG) had been on the statute books 
continuously since 1914. Not only did the law epitomise the then ethnocultural nature of 
German citizenship, having survived both the Weimar Republic and National Socialism to be 
adopted by West Germany (Brubaker 1992), but in doing so it also constituted a direct link 
between the new, unified Germany and the Third Reich. Politically, the law represented the 
culmination of a protracted process spanning almost twenty years (Green 2004). Even the 
law’s passage through parliament during 1999 had been marred by controversy, when the 
conservative CDU ran its now notorious petition campaign against the SPD-Green federal 
government’s original plans to allow dual citizenships on an unrestricted basis (Howard 2008, 
pp. 46-52). Given that in 2010 the law had been in force for ten years, this article takes this 
opportunity to assess the law’s subsequent evolution and impact in practice.  
 
But the third reason for looking at Germany is arguably the most significant: at almost 6.7 
million persons in 2009, Germany is home to by far the largest non-national population in the 
EU.1 By definition, therefore, naturalisation and citizenship policy matters. What is more, 
almost two-thirds of this total, or 4.3 million persons, are TCNs, including some 1.7 million 
Turkish nationals. Given that, therefore, over one-fifth of all the EU’s TCNs reside in 
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Germany, its provisions for and practice of citizenship acquisition is a key determinant of 
access to EU citizenship and the associated rights for this group. 
 
This article proceeds as follows. It begins by briefly sketching out the content of the 2000 
law, before discussing subsequent amendments to it, with particular emphasis on reforms in 
2004 and 2007. It then discusses the law’s quantitative impact, and asks why this has been 
much lower than had originally been anticipated. Subsequently, the article moves to outlining 
some of the other issues which have emerged in citizenship policy before concluding with 
some thoughts on the future direction of German citizenship in the twenty-first century. 
 
 
The content of Germany’s 2000 Citizenship Law 
 
Although it technically constituted an amendment of the RuStAG rather than a complete new 
piece of legislation, there can be little doubt that the 2000 law (or Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz) 
fundamentally reformed access to German citizenship in three key ways (cf. Green 2000). 
First, while the three principal established routes to naturalisation, via state discretion 
(Ermessenseinbürgerung), marriage to a German national or legal entitlement 
(Anspruchseinbürgerung), were retained together with their respective requirements, the 2000 
law practically halved, from fifteen to eight years, the residence period required in order to 
qualify for the latter. The importance of this reduction should not be underestimated, as over 
two-thirds of all naturalisations fall under the category of legal entitlement, compared to less 
than 15 per cent for the other two categories combined (Worbs 2008, pp. 19-20). Moreover, 
with almost two-thirds of the non-national population in 2000 having residence periods of 
over eight years, compared to 40 per cent with over fifteen years, the potential population 
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eligible for naturalisation, at least in terms of residence periods, increased at a stroke by more 
than half.2 
 
Second, the law introduced jus soli for the first time in the history of German citizenship. 
Hitherto, the exclusive reliance on jus sanguinis meant that successive generations of 
migrants’ descendants were born in Germany without automatic access to full citizenship 
rights; in 2009, they accounted for almost one-fifth of the total non-national population. 
However, from 2000, all children of non-nationals where one parent had eight years’ 
residence and was in possession of a permanent residence status became German at birth. 
Over and above this, the law also provided for a transitional arrangement granting children 
born after 1 January 1990, i.e. 10 years before the new citizenship law came into force, the 
right to register as German nationals under the same conditions. Lastly, although the law 
continued Germany’s long tradition of rejecting dual citizenship in naturalisations, it 
introduced some new exceptions to this rule, covering recognised refugees, the over 60s and 
nationals of certain EU member-states (see below).  
 
However, these liberalisations were not as unequivocal as they seemed at first sight. Most of 
all, the introduction of jus soli was in reality closely circumscribed. Thus, the requirement for 
one parent to hold a permanent residence status has proved to be a highly significant barrier, 
as it excludes the comparatively high proportion of non-nationals living in Germany with only 
a temporary residence status. In consequence, only around half of all children born annually 
to non-national parents in the country actually qualify for jus soli (see figures in Beauftragte 
der Bundesregierung 2007, p. 215, also Green 2000, p. 114). Furthermore, and as a direct 
response to the CDU’s highly successful petition campaign in 1999 against multiple 
nationalities, the 2000 law stipulated that the dual citizenships created by jus soli should only 
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be temporary, with beneficiaries having to opt-in to German nationality through obtaining 
release from the other by the age of twenty-three, or else face loss of their German passports 
(the so-called Optionsmodell). This is a point of major significance which will be returned to 
below. 
 
Moreover, in other areas, the law actually imposed new, more restrictive standards. The fees 
for naturalisation were raised fivefold from the equivalent of €51 to €255. A loophole in the 
RuStAG which had allowed especially Turkish nationals who had become Germans to then 
obtain dual citizenship by afterwards renaturalising as Turks, was also closed. Lastly, the law 
also laid down new requirements for (otherwise unspecified) German language competence as 
well as excluding those applicants from citizenship where concrete suspicions (tatsächliche 
Anhaltspunkte) cast doubt on their willingness to conform to Germany’s constitutional order 
(freiheitlich demokratische Grundordnung) – a provision targeted at applicants with extremist 
political tendencies.  
 
This mixture of liberalisations and restrictions has led to a (not entirely surprising) divergence 
in the law’s assessment by politicians and scholars. For instance, in the final parliamentary 
debate on the law in May 1999, Interior Minister Otto Schily praised the reform as ‘historic’, 
and the Green politician Cem Özdemir, himself the naturalised son of Turkish immigrants, 
concluded that ‘on 1 January 2000, this country will gain a new, modern, republican and 
European citizenship law’ (Deutscher Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 14/40, pp. 3415, 3425).3 
Interestingly, this has set the tone for the subsequent presentation of the law by successive 
governments, even those led by the CDU/CSU: most recently, the federal government began 
its written reply to an enquiry (Große Anfrage) by the Left Party on citizenship policy in June 
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2009 by declaring that ‘Germany has an open and modern naturalisation law’ 
(Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13558, p. 3). 
 
By contrast, the response of scholars across the world has been somewhat muted. Certainly, 
there is a widespread consensus that German citizenship can no longer be deemed 
ethnocultural in its essence. Already, Hansen and Koehler (2005), Joppke (1999) and 
Hagedorn (2001) note that the introduction of legal entitlements to naturalisation in 1993 
constitutes an early break with ethnoculturalism. In the law itself, the introduction of jus soli 
is considered a ‘seismic shift’ (Green 2000, p. 114), while Palmowski concludes that ‘both in 
the principle of jus soli, and in the extended practice of dual citizenship, the ethnocultural 
ideal of nationhood that still featured so strongly in Brubaker’s work has been decisively 
breached’ (Palmowski 2008, p. 560; see also Howard 2005, pp. 711-712).  
 
However, a number of caveats are clearly identified. Several scholars (e.g. Howard 2008, pp. 
55-58, Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, p. 204) have pointed to the limited quantitative 
impact of the new law, an issue which will be returned to below, while Davy (2005, p. 142) 
concludes that ‘even after the changes enacted in [2000], German nationality law does not 
meet the sentiments and preferences of long-term immigrants’. Others have pointed out that, 
by formally continuing to reject dual nationality for non-nationals while simultaneously 
accepting it without qualification among ethnic German immigrants (Spätaussiedler), German 
citizenship retains ‘more than a whiff of ethnocultural exclusivity’ about it (Green 2005, p. 
948).  
 
 
Reforming the reform: the evolution of citizenship policy after 2000 
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Although the 2000 law was indisputably a major piece of legislation, its content soon came 
under political scrutiny again, leading to two sets of amendments in 2004 and 2007 which 
focused on the Citizenship Law’s new assimilatory elements requirements for naturalisation. 
The first occurred in 2004, in the course of the formulation of Germany’s first immigration 
law (the Zuwanderungsgesetz). As a result, not only were the various provisions for 
citizenship, which had since 1990 been spread over two separate pieces of legislation, 
consolidated into the single Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, but Germany’s myriad residence 
titles were reduced into effectively two, one temporary and one permanent, thereby 
simplifying access to jus soli. In addition, the standard residential requirement for 
naturalisation by legal entitlement was reduced from eight years to seven for those applicants 
who had completed the new integration courses introduced by the Zuwanderungsgesetz. On 
the question of assimilatory requirements, the political compromise around the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz also included that henceforth all applications for naturalisation should be 
referred to the federal internal security service (Bundesverfassungsschutz) for checking.  
 
Meanwhile, a range of other issues, some practical, some political, had emerged in citizenship 
policy. Initially, as part of the post-2000 naturalisation procedure, all applicants had to sign a 
rather convoluted declaration of constitutional loyalty (see text in Spindler 2002, p. 67). In 
parallel, several cities, on their own initiative although often encouraged by the respective 
Land government, started from 2001 to present naturalisation certificates in the context of 
formal citizenship ceremonies, rather than simply handing them over in the anonymous 
environment of an office, thereby reflecting (independently) the practice which was emerging 
in other European countries such as the UK. Many municipalities wanted to offer a positive 
conclusion to the process of naturalisation (Topçu 2007, pp. 58-61); in doing so, they have 
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provided a contrast to the rather defensive nature of the referral of applications to the security 
service and the declaration of constitutional loyalty.  
 
A second issue concerned the automatic toleration of dual citizenship in applicants from 
certain EU member-states. In the 2000 law, this was limited to countries where reciprocity 
could be established, such as Sweden and the UK. In principle, this left little room for 
interpretation by the 16 federal states, who in Germany are responsible for implementing 
federal policy. However, Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, two conservative states where 
political opposition to dual citizenship is particularly deeply engrained, refused to recognise 
this principle. In 2004, this divergence from national law was struck down by the Federal 
Administrative Court, but even after this, Bavaria continues to reserve the right to check 
whether reciprocity in individual cases is in fact guaranteed (Hofhansel 2008, pp. 180-181, 
Topçu 2007, p. 49).  
 
The third area concerned the provision for ‘adequate competence’ in the German language 
introduced in the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz. Both the law itself and the accompanying 
secondary legislation (Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschriften) left unspecified what constituted 
‘adequate’ language skills and how these might be established. In consequence, the Länder as 
implementing agencies interpreted this provision as they saw fit, leading to considerable 
divergence in practises (see the breakdown in Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13558, pp. 29-31). 
To complicate matters further, the integration courses introduced by the Zuwanderungsgesetz 
in 2005 for new and existing non-national migrants set a higher target for language 
competence, namely level B1 in the Common European Framework of Reference for 
Languages (CEFR), than was demanded by most Länder for naturalisation.  
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The fourth topic to emerge was arguably the most controversial. In early 2006, it emerged that 
two federal states, Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, had introduced different supplementary 
tests for naturalisation candidates. Baden-Württemberg’s was undoubtedly the more 
contentious: it had chosen to complement its security checks with a series of hypothetical 
questions to be put by officials to applicants in an interview in an attempt to elicit their values 
and attitudes on a range of issues, including terrorism, equal rights and homosexuality. But 
what caused the most concern was the fact that the questions were only to be employed in 
cases where the applicants were Muslim (Migration und Bevölkerung 1/2006, pp. 1-2, also 
Joppke 2007, p. 15). Soon after, the state of Hesse introduced a knowledge-based 
naturalisation test, of the kind employed by the United States and Canada and now used by 
the UK and the Netherlands. A lively public and political debate ensued, at the end of which 
the Länder agreed to harmonise naturalisation procedures around a Hesse-style test.  
 
Together, these four areas were incorporated into a second reform, which came into effect in 
early 2007 and which therefore constitutes the altogether more significant of the two post-
2000 amendments to citizenship policy:4 
• As a rule, applicants for naturalisation are now required to demonstrate German 
language skills at Level B1 GER or its equivalent, for instance a school leaving 
certificate. As an incentive, the residential requirement for applicants with high levels 
of integration, for instance language skills at B2 GER, is reduced to six years.  
• In order to demonstrate knowledge of German society, the 2007 reform required 
applicants to pass a harmonised naturalisation test, which was introduced with effect 
from 1 September 2008. In the test, which costs €25 to sit and can be repeated 
indefinitely, candidates have to answer 33 out of a possible 330 multiple-choice 
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questions, with 17 correct responses required to pass. Any applicant who has 
successfully completed school in Germany is exempted.  
• In Section 16, the revised law supplemented the (now amended) written statement of 
loyalty with an aural declaration to be made at the time of the presentation of the 
naturalisation certificate.  
• Lastly, in Section 12 (2), the post-2007 law now automatically permits dual 
citizenship for all applicants from EU member-states and Switzerland.  
 
But the 2007 reforms also included two additional changes, each of which has in fact served 
to raise the bar for naturalisation. First, the existing provision that applicants should be free of 
criminal convictions was amended. Ever since this had been introduced in 1990, sentences of 
up to six months’ prison or an equivalent fine (Tagessätze) did not exclude candidates from 
naturalisation. However, post-2007, under Section 12a of the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, the 
limit has been halved to three months, and offences will now be counted cumulatively, not 
individually.  
 
Even more significant though is a change affecting those non-nationals aged between 18 and 
23: hitherto, they were excluded from the requirement in Section 10 to provide for themselves 
and their dependants. This has now been removed, thereby adding a potentially major 
exclusionary hurdle: given that non-nationals in Germany have disproportionately low 
education and high unemployment outcomes, the chances of applicants in this age group 
being able to support themselves financially are in all likelihood slight.  
 
Cumulatively, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the changes in 2004 and 2007 add up to 
a significant tightening of the 2000 law, which itself was not quite as liberal as had initially 
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been claimed. The article therefore turns to consider the law’s quantitative impact before 
discussing some of the reasons behind this and identifying some of persistent problem areas in 
its operation. 
 
 
Where have all the naturalisations gone? 
 
One of the stated aims of the 2000 reform was to increase the take-up of German citizenship 
in quantitative terms. In his first statement of governmental policy (Regierungserklärung) on 
10 November 1998, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder spelled this out: ‘This government will 
modernise the law on nationality. That [sic] will enable those living permanently in Germany 
and their children born here to acquire full rights of citizenship’ (official translation, cited in 
Howard 2008, p. 49). And there seemed to be every reason to expect this goal to be fulfilled: 
in his initial analysis of the new law, the late Günter Renner confidently predicted that, if 
nothing else, it would result in a significant increase in numbers of naturalisation (Renner 
1999, p. 163).  
 
However, the reality has been somewhat different: as Figure 1 shows, following an initial 
surge in 2000, the absolute numbers of naturalisations have shown a steady decline over a ten-
year period.  
 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
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The extent and severity of this reduction should not be underestimated. Since 2000, 
naturalisations have halved and since 2008 have stood below the symbolic 100,000 mark. 
Moreover, for comparison, Figure 1 also provides naturalisation figures during the 1990s: it is 
notable that since 2008, naturalisation numbers have fallen below 1998 levels. What this 
means is that the current law, with its self-declared modernity and openness, is actually 
helping to create fewer new citizens than the old, supposedly more restrictive law.  
 
This development is even more stark when the development of naturalisations among the 
Turkish population, by far the largest non-national group in Germany, is considered. In fact, 
the number of naturalisations of Turks peaked at 104,000 in 1999, before the new law came 
into force. This was due to a technicality: at that time, each applicant for release from Turkish 
citizenship had to be individually countersigned by the Turkish Prime Minister, leading to a 
huge backlog which happened to be cleared in that year (Green 2004, p. 80). But since then, 
the drop in Turkish naturalisation has been nothing short of dramatic: in 2008 and 2009, the 
number had fallen to under 25,000, representing a fall from 1999 of over 75 per cent 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2010, p. 13). 
 
In comparison with other EU member-states, too, Germany does not fare well. Between 2000 
and 2007, the annual naturalisation rate in Germany fell from 2.6 per cent to 1.6 per cent. By 
contrast, in all other countries with large non-national populations in the EU, such as the UK, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, the naturalisation rate was considerably 
higher. Even Austria, traditionally one of the most stringent countries in terms of 
naturalisations, returned naturalisation rates which have consistently been higher than in 
Germany (see figures in Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13558, p. 51).  
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However, perhaps the most telling comparison is between numbers of naturalisations, which 
have been falling, and the average residence period, which has been rising steadily: whereas it 
stood at 9 years in 1980, it had risen to 16 years in 2003, 17 years in 2006 and 19 years in 
2009. If Germany’s citizenship policy were to be effectual in terms of meeting its stated aim 
of increasing naturalisation, that figure would need to have fallen, as those non-nationals who 
fulfil the residence requirements gradually become citizens and their statistical exit from the 
ranks of non-nationals thereby brings the overall average down. In reality, the rising average 
residence period indicates that the opposite is occurring. This trend is confirmed by official 
calculations of the take-up rate for naturalisation, expressed as a proportion of those eligible 
in terms of both residence period and status (Statistisches Bundesamt 2010, p.15). The results 
are equally meagre: thus, the take-up rate declined by over half from its peak of 3.95 per cent 
in 2000 to just 1.9 per cent in 2009. What this suggests is that while a priori eligibility for 
naturalisation is rising, an increasing number of long-term resident non-nationals are choosing 
not to naturalise.  
 
Of course, the key question arising from this is why this should be the case and what reasons 
underlie this trend. This is undoubtedly a complex issue and difficult to answer with certainty, 
but a number of potential factors can be identified. First, because of the introduction of jus 
soli and the associated transitional arrangement, large numbers of children who might 
otherwise have naturalised with their parents (thereby adding to the total figure) now 
automatically hold German citizenship, at least for the time being (Lämmermann 2009). 
Indeed, Worbs’ analysis (2008, pp. 27-28) shows that between 2000 and 2007, over 355,000 
persons obtained German citizenship via this route, with post-2000 births accounting for 86 
per cent of the total.  
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Second, EU nationals, who account for roughly a third of all non-national residents in 
Germany, have shown a particularly low propensity to naturalise. As the Statistisches 
Bundesamt’s figures (2010, pp. 18-19) show, their take-up rate between 2002 and 2009 varied 
from 0.6 per cent in 2002 to 1.0 per cent in 2004, before gradually falling back to 0.8 per cent 
in 2009. In a way, this is a rather unexpected development, given the extensive concessions 
made to EU nationals, in particular the automatic toleration of dual citizenship after 2007. 
Instead, this probably reflects the comprehensive availability of welfare and residential rights, 
as well as partial availability of political rights (at local and EU level) for EU citizens, which 
has rendered any material gain from naturalisation for this group effectively meaningless.  
 
A third possibility is that the cumulated restrictions introduced in 2005 and 2007/8 are 
deterring many would-be applicants from citizenship. Certainly, the raising of the bar in the 
necessary language skills appears anecdotally to have caused some difficulties (details in 
Lämmermann 2009, pp. 292-293). Likewise, it cannot be discounted that the very existence of 
the naturalisation test has put some applicants off, even though in practice it presents little 
difficulty to those taking it: the pass rate between 1 September 2008 and 31 March 2009 was 
98.7 per cent nationally (Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13558, p. 53). Meanwhile, Howard (2008, 
p. 56) is sceptical of the notion that the fivefold increase of fees in 2000 may have deterred 
applicants, pointing to the fact that internationally Germany, in this respect at least, remains 
firmly in the mid-range of countries. In the past, there have also been a range of factors 
specifically affecting Turkish applicants for naturalisation. In the 1980s, becoming German 
would have meant losing inheritance rights in Turkey; likewise, many young male Turks were 
at that time faced with making considerable payments to release them from the obligation of 
military service in Turkey. But these issues have all long been dealt with from the Turkish 
side and even the process of release from Turkish citizenship, which constituted a very real 
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impediment up until the late 1990s (see above), has now been streamlined and is relatively 
unproblematic. Taking these factors together, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty that 
there is an inverse relationship between the requirements for naturalisation and the numbers 
of naturalisations actually achieved.  
 
In truth, when accounting for falling naturalisation numbers, the real ‘elephant in the room’ is, 
as it has for decades, Germany’s continued formal rejection of dual citizenship in 
naturalisations (cf. Green 2005). That is not to say that the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz has not 
had a significant impact in this area. In particular, the now automatic acceptance of dual 
citizenship for refugees has led to a sharp increase in the proportion of naturalisations where 
multiple nationalities are tolerated. As Figure 2 shows clearly, the introduction of the new law 
in 2000 led to a jump in the rate of acceptance of dual citizenship, which since 2006 has 
exceeded 50 per cent. However, this global figure hides considerable variation by nationality: 
in 2008 and 2009, the toleration rate for Turkish nationals, who still account for about 25 per 
cent of all naturalisations, stood at a much lower 18 per cent and 23 per cent respectively. By 
contrast, for Afghan nationals, almost all of whom will be recognised refugees, the toleration 
rate is close to 100 per cent. 
 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
 
In fact, the real problem lies not in the relatively generous level of toleration, but in the 
emotional break that being released from one’s citizenship of birth can entail, as well as in the 
inconvenience and cost which applicants are expected to shoulder in seeking this release. For 
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instance, dual citizenship is also tolerated when the home country does not in principle release 
its citizens from their nationality. However, in 2009, the interim secondary legislation listed 
just nine countries where this is the case: Afghanistan, Algeria, Eritrea, Iran, Cuba, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Syria and Tunesia (Bundesministerium des Innern 2009, p. 34). In all other cases, 
applicants are expected to attempt to obtain release from their citizenship. Elsewhere, under 
Section 12 of the citizenship law, dual citizenship is generally accepted if the home country 
does not release the applicant within a ‘reasonable’ timescale, if release is linked to 
‘unreasonable’ conditions or if release brings with it ‘significant’ financial costs. Here too, the 
interim secondary legislation spells out just what is considered to be ‘reasonable’ 
(Bundesministerium des Innern 2009, pp. 35-36): thus, if necessary, applicants are expected 
to spend up to two-and-a-half years obtaining release, pay fees connected to the release 
process of up to €1,278.23 and bear general financial disadvantages up to the value of 
€10,225.84 – all in the name of becoming German citizens. It does not seem unreasonable to 
conclude that some applicants for naturalisation end up paying a considerable price in order 
that Germany can maintain its principled opposition to dual citizenship. 
 
Given the emotional, practical and financial costs involved, it is scarcely surprising that 
interest among non-nationals in obtaining German citizenship is overall low. Worbs (2008, 
pp. 28-38) provides a detailed analysis of data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) on 
this question. This shows that in period from 1996 to 2006, interest in obtaining German 
citizenship did increase up to 2000 before dropping off again afterwards; however, the 
proportion of respondents whose intention to naturalise was ‘definite’ or ‘probable’ peaked at 
just 30 per cent in 2000, and by 2006 had fallen back to around 20 per cent. In terms of age 
groups, interest is highest among the 15-24 age group and then wanes considerably with age. 
In particular, Worbs’ analysis demonstrates clearly that the desire to retain one’s citizenship is 
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the principal reason why both Turks and the citizens of former Yugoslavia, the two largest 
national groups among Germany’s immigrants, choose not apply for naturalisation. What is 
more, the second most important reason is that their residence is already secure, indicating 
that these two national groups see little material advantage in becoming German.  
 
Overall, given its initial aim, it is clear that the 2000 law has been a disappointment in 
quantitative terms and falls well short of the high expectations invested in it at the time of 
legislation. Although the number of naturalisations actually showed a slight increase between 
from 2008 to 2009, it is far too early to say whether this constitutes a temporary blip, a 
levelling off or even a reversing of the long-term trend. While the comparatively large number 
of citizenships via jus soli offers some consolation, this is tempered by the fact that around 
half of children born to non-national parents in Germany do not benefit from this facility. In 
addition, research has shown that the bureaucratic upheaval associated with naturalisation 
leaves many new German citizens jaded and disillusioned by the entire experience 
(Wunderlich 2005) – arguably the exact opposite of what would be desired. Lastly, by now 
requiring all applicants, even those between the ages of 18 and 23, to be able to provide for 
themselves and their dependants financially, the 2007 reforms have, deliberately or otherwise, 
raised the bar for precisely the group of non-nationals who have the highest level of interest in 
becoming German.  
 
 
Other issues and challenges 
 
As Germany’s revised citizenship law enters its second decade, its relatively low quantitative 
impact is not the only challenge it faces, as four main technical and administrative issues have 
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also become apparent, some of which will have a significant bearing on the future direction of 
citizenship policy.  
 
First and foremost of these is the future of the Optionsmodell, under which the over 350,000 
beneficiaries of jus soli to date will have to opt-in to German citizenship by obtaining release 
from their other citizenship by the age of 23, or face loss of their German passport. In 2008, 
the first of the cohort naturalised under the transitional arrangement, which included those 
born in 1990, turned 18. By 2013, therefore, they will have to choose either their German or 
their other citizenship. In 2018, the first Germans qua jus soli proper will reach the age of 
majority, and by 2023 they too will have to choose one or the other. While limitations of 
space preclude a more detailed discussion of this problem, the constitutionality of this 
provision is hotly contested, and the issue is certain to end up before the Federal 
Constitutional Court, probably within the next five years. 
 
A second issue concerns the persistence of quite widespread variation between the individual 
Länder as implementing agencies in terms of the standards applied and outcomes in terms of 
naturalisation rates (Worbs 2008, pp. 21-22). Thus in 2007, Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-
Palatinate and Bremen, all states with SPD Interior Ministers, had the highest naturalisation 
rates. By contrast, the more conservative states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg had the 
lowest naturalisation rates in the western part of the country, where around 95 per cent of 
non-nationals live. A similar picture emerges when toleration of dual nationality in 2007 is 
taken into consideration (see Bundestagsdrucksache 16/13558, pp. 31-32): Schleswig-
Holstein and Rhineland-Palatinate again top the list, with Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg 
among the lowest. However, the picture is not as clear as it might initially seem. In 2007, 
Berlin and Bremen, both states with SPD-led governments, had the lowest toleration of dual 
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nationality; likewise, Hesse, Lower Saxony and Northrhine-Westphalia, all with CDU-led 
governments, had above average naturalisation rates and toleration rates for dual citizenship. 
Instead, the size and composition of the respective Land’s non-national population appears to 
be a better guide to likely outcomes in this area, although political leadership can still 
obviously play a role at the margins (Green 2005, pp. 931-932). More prosaically, the level of 
administrative resources available to a state in processing applications is also likely to affect 
outcomes in this area (Hagedorn, 2001, p. 172). 
 
The third issue is related to the second and concerns the way the state administrative 
structures deal with applicants for naturalisation (Lämmermann 2009, pp. 295-296). All too 
often, would-be German citizens are confronted by a structurally conservative bureaucracy 
which is reluctant to recognise the commitment non-nationals are showing by the very act of 
applying for citizenship. For instance, the naturalisation authorities offer little in the way of 
advice and appear unwilling to interpret the existing regulations generously and in the 
interests of increasing naturalisations, as criticised by the federal government’s Commissioner 
for Immigrants, Maria Böhmer, in a parliamentary answer in May 2009 (Deutscher Bundestag 
Plenarprotokoll 16/221, p. 24290). Perhaps surprisingly given the length of Germany’s 
migration history, authorities at either state or municipal level have, with very few exceptions, 
also yet to adopt active strategies to advertise the possibility of naturalisation more widely. 
 
Lastly, the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz is not an easy law to deal with. Its provisions are long, 
detailed and linguistically complex; this makes it difficult to relate the law to users and 
potential beneficiaries, who are of course overwhelmingly non-specialists. Moreover, since 
the 2007 reform, there has been a notable convergence in the conditions and standards laid 
down in the interim secondary legislation for naturalisation by state discretion, by marriage to 
23 
 
a German citizen and by legal entitlement, to the extent that they are now practically the same 
(see Bundesministerium des Innern 2009). There is therefore a case to be made for future 
reforms consolidating the various paths to naturalisation under one heading of legal 
entitlement. 
 
Fortunately, the picture is not all negative and there is one key area which promises positive 
developments in creating a more open German citizenship. Ironically, it is dual citizenship. 
Undoubtedly, this is not a question of formal provisions: given the entrenched political 
opposition of the CDU/CSU, there seems little prospect of Germany relinquishing its 
principled opposition to multiple citizenships any time soon. That said, Germany has since 
2002 left the Council of Europe’s 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple 
Nationality in favour of the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, which adopts a more 
liberal approach to multiple citizenships (Howard 2005, p. 704). This removes one of the 
primary legal arguments against a more widespread acceptance of dual nationality in 
Germany. 
 
Rather, the change will come by accretion. Already, descendants of bi-national parents (where 
one parent is German) generally inherit both citizenships permanently: between 2000 and 
2007, over 600,000 children were born into such bi-national marriages alone (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 2009, p. 57).5 Furthermore, between 2000 and 2009, some 626,000 persons have 
been naturalised with dual citizenship. Any children they have subsequent to obtaining 
German nationality will normally automatically gain both citizenships by descent. The 
Optionsmodell, if overturned by the Federal Constitutional Court, will end up almost doubling 
that figure. Even in its current form, the Optionsmodell may end up creating more dual 
nationals than was originally anticipated: as Dornis (2002, p. 172) notes, if those who have 
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gained German citizenship through jus soli themselves have children before the age of 23, 
their children will inherit this by descent and retain it even if the parent ultimately ends up 
losing their German citizenship. Similarly, the automatic toleration of dual nationality among 
other EU and Swiss nationals means that any descendants of this group who gain German 
nationality via jus soli will exempted from seeking release from one or the other citizenship 
by the time they reach the age of 23. Although it is difficult to establish any reliable estimates 
on the number of dual nationals in Germany, what is certain is that their ranks will swell 
considerably over the next ten years as a result both of the 2000 law and the established 
principles of citizenship ascription in bi-national families. In turn, this raises the prospect that 
the political salience of dual nationality, which has hitherto been high, is neutralised simply 
by virtue of it being more common. And in the longer term, should Turkey ultimately realise 
its aspiration to become an EU member state, then Germany’s rejection of dual citizenship 
becomes for all intents and purposes meaningless, as the single largest non-national group in 
the country would no longer be affected. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is perhaps tempting to think that the challenge of access to citizenship in Germany is 
overstated. After all, Germany’s multicultural team at the 2010 World Cup in South Africa 
included players of Polish, Ghanaian, Turkish and Brazilian ancestry; it thereby invited 
comparisons with France’s famous 1998 Black, Blanc, Beur squad, which itself was seen as 
indicative of that country embracing its diversity. However, as this article has argued, the 
challenge of citizenship policy remains very much alive in Germany. It has shown that the 
liberalising elements of that law, principally the introduction of jus soli and the halving of the 
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residential requirement, were accompanied by a range of new restrictions, which were further 
increased in the 2004 and especially the 2007 amendments. It has also analysed the 
quantitative trend in naturalisations over the past decade, finding that this has fallen far 
behind expectations and pinpointing Germany’s continued rejection of dual citizenships 
(albeit with now numerous exceptions) as the primary reason behind this trend. 
 
In doing so, the article shows that the development of Germany’s citizenship policy is now 
clearly in step with the overall trend across the EU. With the increased focus on language 
tests as a precondition for naturalisation, flanked by the recent introduction of citizenship tests 
and ceremonies, there is broad convergence with what has become a more-or-less standard 
constellation of policy instruments in Europe (cf. Vink and de Groot 2010). Nonetheless, the 
analysis reiterates that important insights can be gained from the study of individual country 
cases. As this article has shown, the details of Germany’s provisions for jus soli mean that it 
cannot easily be slotted into a given category; similarly, its approach to dual and multiple 
citizenships is more complex than simple opposition. Even a consideration of Germany’s 
naturalisation rate does not capture the full impact of its citizenship policies across the board. 
Certainly, there are many specificities that could not be touched on here for reasons of space, 
especially those pertaining to the politics, ideology and identity of citizenship, and the reader 
is referred to the range of influential contributions which already exist on these questions (e.g. 
Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, Palmowski 2008, Green 2005).  
 
Overall, and for all the problems with the new law, it is worth remarking on the degree to 
which the historically high levels of naturalisation, which have now been sustained for a 
decade, have changed Germany. Between 2000 and 2010, over 1.3 million persons were 
naturalised, including almost 470,000 Turks. Added to this number are almost 400,000 
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children and young people who between 2000 and 2008 received German citizenship, albeit 
temporarily, via jus soli. This estimated total exceeding 1.7 million over ten years compares 
with just 244,000 naturalisations between 1972 and 1989, and 926,000 in the 27 years 
between 1972 and 1999. This comparatively high total has also changed the electoral 
dynamics of citizenship: in a party system where recent federal elections have generally been 
close-run affairs, political parties have woken up to the fact that these large numbers of 
naturalised votes can make the difference between victory and defeat (on this topic, see Wüst 
2004). 
 
It is also worth returning briefly to the question of whether Germany, by virtue not of the 
content but of the relatively exclusive outcome of its citizenship law, retains an ethnocultural 
colouring in its definition of membership. Certainly, the cumulative impact of the 2000 
reform, including in dual citizenship, has helped this colouring to fade further, although not as 
much as would have been the case had dual citizenship been accepted unequivocally. But an 
ethnocultural tinge was also provided by ethnic German immigrants (Spätaussiedler), whose 
privileged immigration conditions and automatic naturalisation, including full dual 
citizenship, created a situation where it was tempting to conclude that ‘ethnicity provides an 
edge that mere residence and payment of taxes does not’ (Green 2000, p. 118, also Brubaker 
1992, p. 170). This was of particular significance during the early 1990s, when the very high 
numbers of such immigrants (over 200,000 per annum between 1991 and 1995) inherently 
emphasised the contrast between membership of the ethnocultural group and outsiders. 
However, since the turn of the Millennium, numbers have begun to drop quite significantly, 
falling below 10,000 in 2006. In 2009, just 3,000 ethnic Germans and their dependants were 
arriving in Germany. In the light of such low migration, the notion of ethnocultural privilege 
quite simply loses its relevance.  
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More broadly, there has been a palpable transformation in public discourse away from the 
rather binary division between ‘Germans’ and ‘foreigners’ (see Faist 1994) towards 
‘migration background’ (Migrationshintergrund) as the defining characteristic (see 
Palmowski 2008 for a more thorough discussion of this shift). A key factor in this 
reorientation was the publication in 2005 of new census data (Mikrozensus), which showed 
that almost one person in five in Germany (and obviously much higher in urban areas) either 
themselves had a personal experience of migration or at least one parent or grandparent with a 
personal experience of migration – typically for reasons of work, asylum or as an ethnic 
German. This startling revelation has helped to shift policy debates away from the hitherto 
prevalent ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourse, which is certain to change perceptions about citizenship 
in the medium term.  
 
However, in the meantime, Germany will continue to grapple with the challenge not just of 
making access to its citizenry easier in principle, but also of achieving this in practice. 
Important as the post-2000 increases in naturalisation are, the baseline is so low that, on 
current trends, the non-national population in Germany will remain broadly constant in size, it 
will be increasingly well-settled and, especially among the older group of first generation 
immigrants, effectively permanently excluded from political participation. Of course, it is a 
moot point whether it is incumbent on non-nationals to seek naturalisation so that they can 
participate, or on the host state to ensure that this is an attractive option to them. But this 
misses the key point that Germany as a country and a polity loses far more in terms of 
legitimacy than individual non-nationals do through non-participation in the political process. 
That being the case, the debate over the content, direction and impact of Germany’s 
citizenship legislation looks set to remain on the agenda for some years yet. 
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Figure 1: Naturalisations in Germany, 1990-2009 
 
Note: Figures exclude naturalisations of ethnic Germans.  
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
Figure 2: Toleration of dual citizenship, 1997-2009 
 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 
 
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
to
le
ra
te
d
37 
 
                                                 
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank Marc Morjé Howard and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this article. 
 
Author note: Simon Green is Professor of Politics and Co-Director of the Aston Centre for Europe at Aston 
University. His research interests include citizenship policy in Europe and German politics. Most recently, he 
has co-authored the second edition of The Politics of the New Germany (Routledge). 
 
Notes: 
1
 In 2004, a recalculation of the available data was undertaken by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt), as a result of which the number of non-nationals was adjusted downwards by some 600,000 
persons. Before 2004, the number of non-national residents was 7.3 million, a figure which itself had remained 
stable since 1996. See Statistisches Bundesamt (2010, p. 15). 
2
 It should not of course be forgotten that individual applicants may not have been eligible for naturalisation due 
to other factors, such as the requirement to be able to provide for oneself.  
3
 All direct translations from the German are the author’s. 
4
 The 2007 reform was not actually a separate legislative process, but occurred in the context of the transposition 
of eleven EU directives into German law. 
5
 Of course, this principle also applies to children born to mixed nationality (German) parentage abroad. It is 
likely that this figure will add several hundred thousand more persons to the total. 
 
 
 
